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Inheritance, Urbanization, and Political Change in Europe 
Mircea Popa 
 
Abstract 
 
Urbanization and the development of middle and working classes has been proposed as a key 
explanation for political change in the Western world. This article argues that the traditional 
inheritance systems practiced across Europe have played an important role in the differential 
development of these urban classes in the period 1700-1900. Inheritance systems which 
practice some degree of inequality between heirs will lead to more children, generally younger 
brothers, leaving the land and taking up urban occupations. A statistical analysis of 
geographical data shows that regions in which such unequal inheritance was practiced were 
two to three times more likely to develop urban areas after 1700. This claim is robust to a 
number of challenges, including country fixed effects, and to only looking at Western Europe. 
An important mechanism through which the divergence may have occurred is illustrated 
through a quantitative analysis of pairs of brothers in the UK and Romania, two countries with 
opposing inheritance traditions. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The literature on the comparative political development of Europe has often put the interaction 
between social classes (landowners, peasantry, capitalists, workers), or income groups (the 
rich, the middle class, and the poor) at the forefront of the analysis (Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010). 
One common factor to these arguments is the key role played by emerging urban groups 
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including the middle classes, workers, and intellectuals, in demanding and achieving 
institutional change. Understanding the mechanisms behind the rise of these urban groups is 
therefore important for understanding the modernization, or lack thereof, of European political 
systems. This article will put forward an argument for the importance of different inheritance 
traditions across Europe for the extent of urban development. After discussing some conceptual 
issues regarding inheritance practices, the article will present quantitative evidence based on 
geographical information systems (GIS) analysis of European urbanization, as well as on a 
quantitative biographical analysis of elites under two opposing inheritance systems, in favor of 
the importance of inheritance practices for social change after 1700. 
Following the foundational work of Moore (1966), a number of authors have 
emphasized the crucial role of new urban classes for democratic development. Rueschemeyer 
et al. (1992) see democratization as a result of capitalist development enlarging the middle and 
working classes. Luebbert (1991) explains the formation of liberal, social democratic, and 
fascist regimes through different alliances being formed between the middle class, workers, 
and the peasantry. Collier (1999) analyzes the process of democratization as a result of 
struggles between the working class and elites. Boix (2003) explains democratization through 
a game-theoretic model featuring groups with differential asset endowments and mobility, and 
emphasizes the crucial role of the rise of a middle class. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) 
present a model in which democratization may occur when the poor manage to solve a 
collective action problem, which would be easier when they formed an urban working class. 
Przeworski (2009) similarly conceptualizes the struggle over democratization as one between 
elites and other social classes, and finally, Ansell and Samuels (2014) see democratization as 
emerging when rising economic groups demand protection from the state. 
If the importance of these new classes is to be taken seriously, the immediate question 
is then why and how did some countries and regions, and not others, develop them? Beyond 
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this natural interest in going one step back the causal path, understanding more about the 
formation of new social classes can help give a better understanding of the relations between 
these new classes and the old, landed groups. A situation where numerous family connections 
exist between the parallel landed and urban groups can be conjectured to lead to different 
outcomes than a situation where the groups form perpetually separate dynasties. Integrating 
such factors into our theorizing of inter-class relations can be useful, for example, for 
explaining the toleration and even collaboration between landed elites and capitalists in Britain 
(Landes 2003), and Prussia (Schonhardt-Bailey 1998). 
This article proposes that an important factor which has shaped the formation of non-
landed, urban, classes in Europe, has been the different inheritance customs practiced in 
various regions of the continent. The article will argue that the crucial distinction between 
systems of equal distribution of assets between at least male children, versus systems where 
some inequality in inheritance between brothers was tolerated, had important effects on the 
development of non-landed groups in the 18th and 19th centuries. In regions where equal 
inheritance was the rule, the incentives for leaving the land for the sons of either the great 
landowners or the peasantry were lower than the corresponding incentives for children in the 
regions where a substantial expectation existed for some of them (most often brothers other 
than the eldest) to not inherit significant amounts of land or property. A direct measure of the 
extent of such development of non-landed groups is the extent of urbanization, and especially 
the dynamic of this measure. While urbanization was undoubtedly a multicausal outcome, the 
empirical evidence presented in the following suggests that this inheritance mechanism was 
significant enough by itself to warrant its introduction among the factors that have shaped the 
comparative historical development of the continent. 
The first piece of empirical evidence in favor of this hypothesis comes from an analysis 
of geographical data on inheritance rules and urban growth across Europe, in the period 1700-
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1900. Using geographical information systems (GIS) data from Klein Goldewijk et al. (2010, 
2011), as well as information on inheritance practices from Todd (1990), the results show that 
regions with unequal inheritance customs were some two to three times more likely to develop 
urban areas throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. These results are robust to a set of 
geographical controls, and more importantly, hold for within-country variation as well. As 
expected from the theoretical discussion in section three, regions that had higher population 
growth saw a greater effect of unequal inheritance. The political effects of the two inheritance 
systems are also illustrated quantitatively: starting from similar baselines, countries with UI 
systems are shown to have become more democratic throughout the 19th century. 
Another piece of quantitative evidence in favor of the theoretical argument will come 
from an analysis of the career paths of pairs of brothers from the elites of two countries 
representative of the two inheritance traditions: the United Kingdom and Romania. Using 
historical records of elite family genealogies, we code the career paths of pairs of at least two 
brothers, and show that there was no differentiation given by birth order in the career paths of 
brothers in Romania, but significant differentiation existed between the first-born and younger 
brothers in the UK, with the younger brothers being more likely to switch to non-agricultural 
occupations, which confirms that this mechanism was indeed present in these two cases. 
 
2. Discussion of historical inheritance practices and literature review 
The practice of distributing the wealth of the parents to all children equally upon death has not, 
by any means, been universal in European history. Not only did women not share rights of 
inheritance with their brothers in many societies (Goody 1978), but a practice of unequal 
distribution of inherited wealth among sons can also be encountered in many instances in the 
continent’s history. Defining an equal or unequal inheritance system is not straightforward, as 
there are a number of aspects of inequality to take into consideration. We will be focusing on 
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the distribution between sons, rather than all children, as wealth transfers towards daughters, 
in the form of dowries at marriage or inheritance at death, are less relevant for our theoretical 
argument, given that few women in the period under discussion had either the freedom to 
choose different economic pathways or independent control of their wealth, which are crucial 
elements in the argument. 
Regarding the definition of unequal inheritance among sons, there are a few criteria by 
which this could be made: A first source of inequality is the existence of the institution of 
“entail” (majorat in French, mayorazgo in Spanish), which can be allowed or mandated by 
law. Entail was the legal procedure which prevented each generation from freely disposing of 
the land inherited, and it usually encompassed the inability to sell the land, as well as the 
obligation to pass the land undivided to the first born son. The second source of inequality, 
even in the absence of entails, and applying to non-landed property as well, is the issue of 
testamentary freedom—to what extent is a testator able to freely decide how to distribute his 
or her wealth after death (Beckert 2008), with major differences along this dimension persisting 
until the present day. Both of these legalistic dimensions however are dominated for the 
purposes of our argument by the customs actually practiced. That is, the definition of unequal 
inheritance adopted here is that of a situation where there is a widespread expectation among 
heirs of a possibility of unequal distribution of inherited wealth, arising from either legal 
limitations or from the decisions of the testators. Inheritance systems will therefore be 
categorized into two groups (Sabean 1978, Todd 1985a): those in which the general practice is 
the equal distribution of wealth among at least male descendants, and those in which the general 
practice allows at least some degree of inequality among male descendants. The two groups 
will be referred in the following by the simplified terms “equal inheritance” (EI), and “unequal 
inheritance” (UI), although the terms “symmetric” and “asymmetric” have also been used. 
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A few points regarding the origins and functioning of equal and unequal inheritance 
practices are relevant for the argument. The first point regards the origins of EI/UI practices, 
which are important for empirical arguments that rely on the exogeneity of this variable. A 
number of game-theoretical works have sought to explain why a custom of UI, such as 
primogeniture, might be adopted. These works point to the advantages of UI systems in terms 
of minimizing the chance of dynastic extinction and maximizing the chance of upward social 
mobility for the favored heir (Chu 1991), of serving as signals of parental affection in case the 
distribution is freely chosen by the parents (Bernheim and Severnov 2003), and of minimizing 
rent-seeking by potential heirs (Baker and Miceli 2005). In the same vein Bertocchi (2006) 
presents a theoretical analysis of the effect of industrialization on the shift from primogeniture 
to equal division. A related discussion is the role of primogeniture in the choosing of heirs to 
the throne in monarchies. Kokkonen and Sundell (2014) look at the role of primogeniture in 
the succession to the crown in European dynasties, and argue that it provided a credible 
commitment by the monarch to reward loyalty, after his or her death. 
Empirically, the origins of unequal inheritance customs lie in the Middle Ages (Bloch 
2014 pp 200-221). De Long (2003) argues, following Adam Smith, that in England 
primogeniture arose as a natural consequence of the fact that a fief was granted by the king in 
return for service, and when the holder died, the optimal choice for the king was for the contract 
to be continued with a single heir, in order to keep the fief intact. Spring (1997) similarly 
argues, based on a review of existing literature, that the development of primogeniture in 
England likely occurred along with the development of the feudal order, but that the precise 
origins are unknown, and Howell (1978) confirms that by the 12th century the principle of 
impartible inheritance was in use among the peasantry in Britain. In continental Europe, the 
origins of UI practices are similarly ancient. Kaser (2002), argues that rules of equal inheritance 
among males, and dowries for women, can be traced back to the inheritance laws of the Roman 
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Empire. While in the west of the Empire, Germanic conquest altered some of these practices, 
in the Eastern part they survived over the millennia (Laiou-Tomadakis 1977 cited in Kaser 
2002). After becoming prevalent in Germany, UI customs were spread between the 11th and 
14th centuries through colonization by Germanic landlords, and reached as far as Prussia, 
Bohemia, and Silesia. Le Roy Ladourie (1978) also argues that the inheritance traditions of the 
various parts of France can be traced to the Middle Ages. EI traditions in parts of Slavic Eastern 
Europe are connected by Kaser (2002) to the tribal origins of village communities in these 
regions, taken together with the predominance of slash-and-burn agriculture in the medieval 
period, which led to all men having equal access to cleared land. While the details of the 
historical origins of inheritance systems are beyond the scope of this analysis, what is important 
is the agreement in the literature on their ancient origins, which will strengthen empirical 
arguments in which the exogeneity of this variable is important. 
The second relevant question is on how much inequality and discretion was actually 
present in the various UI systems. What is important here is that “unequal inheritance” as a 
causal factor is better understood as the possibility of unequal inheritance, with significant 
heterogeneity in the extent of this inequality being possible not only between countries or 
regions, but also between families and generations. Not even the archetypal English system of 
primogeniture meant that younger sons went completely unprovided for. While the principle 
that land should pass undivided to the oldest son was general, Spring (1997) argues that the 
system of “strict settlement” which developed in the 17th century allowed wealth transfers 
towards younger sons, but also says England had the most extreme form of inheritance 
inequality in Europe. Landes (2003) argues that the need for such transfers incentivized 
landowners to practice economy in order to be able to provide for the younger sons, and Cooper 
(1978) shows that land acquired by a great landowner during his life was often not subject to 
strict settlement, although Spufford (1978) also shows in her study of Cambridgeshire that wills 
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most often provided for younger sons as well as daughters from the future profits of the main 
estate, which was given undivided to the eldest son. In parts of Germany, primogeniture came 
with the obligation on the part of the brother inheriting the land to provide financial support 
for his younger brothers (Habbabunk 1955), and distinctions between regions where 
impartibility of land was universal and regions where some families chose to divide the land 
equally did exist inside the country (Berkner 1978). In France, before the Revolution, a testator 
in general could freely dispose of between one half and three quarters of his or her property, 
only if they wanted, and noble estates could be passed from one generation to the other in a 
system of entail, but with one third of the property being reserved for younger children (Beckert 
2008). Spain, while abolishing entails in 1836, which were practiced among the nobility, still 
allowed a degree of UI, with for example one son in a family of four sons being allowed to 
inherit three quarters of a property (Spring 1977). The source of data used in the empirical 
analysis, from Todd (1990), codes the two systems according to the actual practice which 
prevailed for the majority of the population, and similar to our use, codes unequal inheritance 
as the expectation that significant, but not necessarily complete, differentiation would occur 
between heirs. 
The third question, which is relevant for the proposed mechanism through which 
inheritance practices influence urbanization, deals with how younger sons were expected to 
provide for themselves in unequal inheritance systems, given that the default “career path”, 
that of making a living from the land or other assets inherited from parents was not available 
to them. Their career choices depended on social class. In England, the most common 
occupations for the younger sons of the gentry and nobility were government employment, 
sometimes in the colonies, the military, the clergy, and other private employment (Landes 
2003, Spring 1997), the latter especially for the sons of the gentry (Wallis and Webb 2011, 
Howell 1978). For the younger sons of the peasantry, industrial employment became an option 
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in England in the 19th century (Howell 1978). In Prussia, the military and public administration 
were the career of choice for the younger sons of landowners (Stern 1977). For peasant younger 
sons, paid employment, either agricultural or non-agricultural, was the default choice. In 
Germany and the German- dominated regions of Eastern Europe, younger sons often became 
household servants (Kaser 2002). Habakkuk (1955) similarly argues that in Bohemia and 
Silesia younger peasant sons became paid agricultural workers and when the opportunity arose, 
became industrial and service-sector workers in the cities. This evidence from the historical 
literature justifies a theoretical approach in which one of the factors linking unequal inheritance 
to urbanization is through younger siblings taking on paid, possibly non-agricultural 
occupations. 
A final issue to be touched upon is the transition from the various UI systems to the 
contemporary equal-inheritance systems across Europe. This is relevant because most regions 
abandoned unequal inheritance practices throughout the late 19th and 20th centuries, which 
means the arguments here cannot be easily extended to the contemporary world. The data 
source for coding inheritance types, Todd (1990), refers to the prevalent inheritance custom 
among the majority of the population between 1500 and 1900, and therefore 1900 will be the 
latest date at which the effects of traditional inheritance customs are considered. 
 
3. Theory 
This section will discuss two complementary reasons why unequal inheritance may 
stimulate urbanization and the emergence of non-landed occupations, as well as a third, more 
speculative one. The primary reason is of course that in the absence of a plot of land to work 
or to extract rents from, the younger sons of both great landowners as well as peasants need to 
find other occupations, which can possibly, though not necessarily, be non-agricultural. The 
historical literature on inheritance systems confirms this: Berkner and Mendels (1978) argue 
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that out-migration from the village is a key result of impartible (unequal) inheritance, while 
low emigration from the villages should be a basic feature of equal partible inheritance, and 
Todd (1990) also argues that the need for those without an inheritance to find alternative 
occupations was a basic feature of unequal inheritance. Pressures for leaving the land can exist 
in EI systems as well, especially under conditions of population increase, but they will 
generally be weaker for a host of reasons: It will almost always be the case that a son left with 
one half or even one third of a property has less incentive to completely abandon agriculture 
than one left with no land at all. This would clearly be the case when the divided plots are 
enough by themselves to sustain an acceptable lifestyle, as would generally be the case for 
families with more substantial properties, which may have disproportionate influence over 
urbanization or the lack thereof. Even for poor families, in which the division is more likely to 
make the plot too small to sustain a livelihood, not only does this generally happen later, but 
the presence of some property still makes it more likely that the owner takes up paid 
agricultural employment to make up for the shortfall rather than giving up agriculture 
altogether. Confirming this logic, Todd (1990) argues that the grand exploitation, in which 
peasants work as sharecroppers or employees for a landlord, was a natural result of 
fragmentation of peasant wealth under equal inheritance. Moreover, the over-division 
argument applies much less to homes, which can be divided and extended to a larger extent. 
Even for dynasties of landless laborers, the prospect of a share of a house as inheritance would 
act as a strong attractor to the countryside, compared to the absence of housing. 
 The second, and complementary, reason why UI systems may encourage the 
development of non-agricultural activities is because undivided plots of land may have higher 
productivity than fragmented plots. If this is the case, then the share of the population that 
needs to be engaged in agriculture can be lower, freeing up labor for other activities. The belief 
that undivided plots are more productive seems to have been offered as an argument in favor 
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of the primogeniture system in both England and Prussia (Cooper 1978, Howell 1978 for 
England; Berkner 2008 for Prussia). In a connected argument, Bertocchi (2006) assumes, based 
on historical evidence, that primogeniture was maintained to improve the efficiency of the 
estate. Grant (2002) addresses the question directly, using data on agricultural productivity 
from 19th century Germany. Grant shows that regions that featured primogeniture increased 
their agricultural productivity faster, and argues a possible explanation for this is the 
inefficiency of land fragmentation under equal division. Modern empirical research confirms 
that farm fragmentation is a barrier to productivity-enhancing technological change (Niroula 
and Thapa 2005, Rahman and Rahman 2009, Manjunatha et al. 2013) and land consolidation 
is seen by development organizations and governments facing fragmentation as a basic tool for 
improving agricultural efficiency (Sabates-Wheeler 2002). Superior land productivity would 
therefore allow the emergence of a demand for labor in the cities, which complements the 
increased supply which may otherwise be mostly absorbed in the agricultural sector. Connected 
to this, for the children better-off families there were few such attractive employment 
opportunities in the countryside, making a move to the city a natural outcome. 
 To these two reasons, which are quite straightforward, another conjecture could be 
added: A situation where younger sons of landowners leave agricultural life and join other 
occupations is more conducive to the landowning class tolerating or encouraging the growth 
of those non-agricultural sectors of the economy, than one in which they form a perpetually 
isolated class. When an elite family has interests in non-agricultural sectors through its sons 
and daughters, these sectors are more likely to be perceived as legitimate additions to the 
traditional agricultural economy. And as entrenched political actors are likely to be prime 
opponents of economic transformation (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000b), alleviating this 
opposition has to be a key component of economic change. There is evidence from the United 
Kingdom, as well as from Prussia, that this was indeed the case. For Britain, Landes (2003) 
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emphasizes the great symbolic importance of the possibility of younger sons leaving the gentry 
and joining the trades. While the number of younger sons joining industry and the commercial 
world was limited, the existence of such cases gave legitimacy to professional and industrial 
occupations. Similarly, in Prussia, the military and bureaucracy, which were typical 
destinations for the younger sons of the junkers became prestigious occupations, and therefore 
legitimate additions to the traditional economy. 
 This discussion points to the main hypothesis to be tested, namely that UI systems 
should lead to more urbanization, where urbanization captures the political and economic 
transformations that arise when a part of the population leaves agriculture. A secondary 
hypothesis is that an important channel through which this effect is transmitted is through 
differential occupational specialization of younger sons in UI and EI systems: we expect that 
UI systems should see younger sons adopting non-agricultural occupations to a greater extent 
than first-born sons, and no such differentiation in EI systems. 
The level of population growth should play a part in determining the extent of the 
dynamics presented in the previous paragraphs. In a constant-population regime, on average 
each couple will have one son, and the expected number of younger sons will be zero. Any 
given couple might have more than zero younger sons, and for these unlucky children the same 
considerations apply in UI systems, but the extent of the process will be more limited than in 
a situation of positive population growth. A third hypothesis to emerge from this is that the 
effect of UI systems on urbanization should be greater in times and in regions of high 
population growth. 
As the connection between the rise of urban classes and democratization has been 
theorized before, another immediate implication of the theoretical framework is that 
inheritance traditions should also serve as useful predictors of political outcomes, which is also 
briefly illustrated in the empirical section. 
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4. Empirical analysis 
GIS data and results 
Data on historical urbanization in Europe is available from a number of sources including de 
Vries (1984), Bairoch (1988), and Chandler (1987). Data from these three sources, together 
with historical data on population and landcover has been assembled in GIS format by Klein 
Goldewijk et al. (2010, 2011) (henceforth referred to as the HYDE dataset), and Ellis et al. 
(2010) (henceforth the Anthromes dataset). The authors of the HYDE GIS dataset have used 
the urbanization data from de Vries (1984), Bairoch (1988), and Chandler (1987), and national 
population data from McEvedy and Jones (1978), Livi-Bacci (2007), Maddison (2001), 
Denevan (1992), and Lahmeyer (2004), together with historical landcover data to model 
population densities in 1700, 1800, 1900, and 2000. The Anthromes dataset uses inputs from 
the HYDE data to categorize landcover across the world in the same years, using a 19-point 
classification ranging from dense urban settlements to wildlands. 
The HYDE and Anthromes GIS data are provided as rasters with a resolution of 5 arc-
minutes. When using urban development as a dependent variable, we code this as a 1 if the cell 
is coded as an urban area by Ellis et al. (comprising the subcategories 11- ”Urban”, and 12-
”Mixed settlements” in their 19-point classification), and 0 otherwise. The HYDE data will be 
used for two control variables indicating population density and population growth; and also 
for an alternative dependent variable, in which urban population size is used instead of cell 
urbanization status. This raster data was combined with vector data on European borders, city 
locations, and subnational (“NUTS”) regions from Eurostat (retrieved April 2015).  
The information on inheritance rules was obtained from the work of Todd (1985; 1987; 
1990; 1999). The main source is Todd (1990), where inheritance types are coded as part of a 
family-types classification at the granularity of European NUTS-3 subnational regions. This 
source covers mostly Western Europe—up to the borders of Finland, West Germany, Austria, 
 14 
and Italy, so this was extended with the information provided in Todd (1999), to include 
Eastern European regions as well. We coded as unequal inheritance (UI) the NUTS regions 
identified by Todd (1990, 1999) as such. This include the absolute nuclear and stem family 
types, including the incomplete stem type in the models in the body of the paper. The equal 
inheritance types are the egalitarian nuclear, and the communitarian family types. A small 
number of regions in France, Austria, and Finland, are identified as “mixed” between the two 
types in Todd (1990), and in the models presented in the body of the paper these are not 
analyzed. Results coding these regions as either UI or EI are included in the replication 
materials and are very similar to results presented here. The final inheritance-types and urban 
areas map is presented in Figure 1. 
Todd’s coding of family types has received some critical attention (see Rijpma and 
Carmichael 2016). However, Rijpma and Carmichael compare Todd’s coding with an 
alternative coding proposed by Murdock (1967), and show that while the two generally agree 
on identifying symmetric inheritance practices in a global sample, which is reassuring for the 
accuracy of both sources. Murdock’s sample, however, has poor coverage in Europe, making 
it difficult to compare it with Todd’s subnational European data. Another concern about Todd’s 
coding is that it focuses on inheritance traditions which apply for the great majority of the 
population, which in some cases ignores the existence of institutions such as majorat or 
mayorzago, which allowed the great nobility to induce a degree of inequality in their 
inheritance. The empirical section will discuss this, and argue this is unlikely to materially 
affect the results. 
These sources of GIS information were all overlaid as a raster map, using the format of 
the Anthromes data. This raster grid was then exported as a dataset using software provided by 
Muller (2005). In this dataset, each map cell becomes an observation, identified by x and y 
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coordinates and the variables described above are recorded for each such observation. In all, 
the European land map is described by 125,648 cells (observations). 
The basic type of statistical model estimated in Tables 1 and 2 is a logistic regression 
of the form Cxyt = logistic (𝛽0 + 𝛽1Cxyt- + 𝛽2inheritxy + 𝛽3Xxyt +(	𝛽4Cxy )+ 𝜀xyt). This models the 
urbanization status of cell (x, y) at time t (1900 in most models) as a function of its urbanization 
at some point in the past t-, of the inheritance type prevalent over cell (x, y), and of various 
controls, included in the vector Xxyt, and possibly fixed effects Cxy . (Models without the control 
for past urbanization status are also included). The error 𝜀xyt has to be assumed as suffering 
from spatial autocorrelation, due to the dependence of neighboring cells in the raster map, as 
is standard with geographical data (Conley 1999). To address this, all models will be presented 
with standard errors and p-values that use the Conley (1999) spatial autocorrelation correction, 
implemented in software by Conley (retrieved April 2015). This “sandwich” estimator allows 
for an arbitrary autocorrelation structure in the residuals (up to order 4 autocorrelation in the 
models presented in the body, with results allowing for higher-levels autocorrelation being 
similar and available in the replication materials). 
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Figure 1: Traditional inheritance practices across Europe 
 
As the treatment variable (inheritance type) is argued by Todd to have been 
geographically stable for many centuries before 1900, models which include just urbanization 
at time t as the dependent variable, without past urbanization among the controls, are by 
themselves instructive. Such models simply show whether urbanization was higher or lower in 
the treatment group at any given point in time. However, dynamic models in which past 
urbanization is controlled for have a few advantages, so these will be the main focus in the 
following. Controlling for urbanization in 1700 in a model where the dependent variable is 
urbanization in 1900 allows to parse out permanent or long-run factors that favor the 
urbanization of a region (this includes biological and geographical factors such as availability 
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of natural resources, waterways, natural harbors, and other such factors which are stable). Also, 
this allows to control for relevant factors in the baseline period (1700 here) which could have 
influenced subsequent urbanization, such as for example the population density in the region 
or rate of population increase. 
Fixed-effects models that look at variation inside a country, between regions under two 
types of inheritance traditions allow to control for any national-level factors might have 
influenced urbanization patterns. We opted to use fixed effects for current-day (2017) 
countries, which for Western Europe are the same as those of 1900, with the exception of the 
separation of Ireland from the UK. In Eastern Europe, this means the use of fixed effects for 
the regions of the Austria-Hungary which later became independent countries. This allows to 
control any factors which might be constant at the level of these regions, and cannot, by 
definition, be less restrictive than using the larger territorial entity. 
For each model, the effect of the inheritance variable is presented in terms of both the 
odds ratio and its logistic regression coefficient. The odds ratios in this case have a simple 
interpretation, as the proportion between urbanized regions and non-urbanized regions. An 
odds ratio of 2 means that this proportion doubles under the treatment, corresponding to a very 
substantial effect. 
Model 1 presents a logistic regression of urbanization in 1700 on the unequal 
inheritance dummy. The results show that unequal inheritance areas had achieved higher 
urbanization by 1700. Model 2 presents the same model with the dependent variable being 
urbanization status in 1900. The coefficient and odds ratio on inheritance type increase and 
become more precisely estimated. This shows that the connection between inheritance type 
and urbanization became even stronger between 1700 and 1900. While these two results 
confirm our theoretical expectations, dynamic models which look at urbanization in 1900 
controlling for urbanization in 1700 have some advantages, as described in the previous 
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section, so these are the main focus in the following. Model 3 presents results in which 
urbanization status in 1700 is controlled for. This baseline result shows that the unequal 
inheritance regime dummy generates an odds ratio of 3.2, corresponding to a situation where 
urbanized regions are 3.2 times more likely to be encountered in unequal inheritance areas, 
which is very substantively significant. Model 4 addresses the concern that if unequal 
inheritance areas had higher population densities to begin with, they may have been more likely 
to become urbanized between 1700 and 1900. This specification controls for the estimated 
population density of the area at the start of the period. Adding this control reduces the size of 
the coefficient and odds ratio on the inheritance dummy somewhat, but still leaves a very 
meaningful substantive effect from the unequal inheritance treatment. Another way to deal 
with this concern is to eliminate low-density areas from the sample, up to a level which leaves 
the treatment and control groups balanced on this variable. Model 5 presents model 4 estimated 
on only areas with population densities above 14 per sq km. In this sample the average 
population densities in the treatment and control groups are almost exactly equal (51.13 vs 
51.22). The coefficients here are very similar to those in the previous specification. Similarly, 
models 17, 18 and 19 are estimated on only a Western European sample. In this sample the 
two groups again have almost equal average population densities, and the results do not change. 
Another possible concern is that unequal inheritance areas had higher population 
increases between 1700 and 1900. There is no straightforward way to measure the population 
increase of the area which is relevant for the urbanization of any given map cell. Controlling 
for the population increase of the cell itself, as in model 6, is endogenous, as the population 
increase itself reflects urbanization. This would underestimate the true effect of the treatment, 
because of post-treatment bias. Therefore model 7 controls for population increase at the level 
of the (present day) country between 1700 and 1900. Given constant levels of population 
increase, it was still the case that unequal inheritance areas became more urbanized. 
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 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 
Uneq .708** 1.181** 1.202** .650** .658** .428** .651** .699** .252 
inheritance (.143) (.090) (.086) (.088) (.098) (.098) (.088) (.105) (.190) 
Odds ratios 2.031** 3.260** 3.329** 1.915** 1.879** 1.534** 1.917** 2.011** 1.287 
Urbaniz.  1700   5.442** 1.881** 1.743** 1.806** 1.913** 2.166** 1.365** 
   (.137) (.140) (.141) (.156) (.141) (.192) (.252) 
Log(pop    1.590** 1.820** 1.805** 1.576** 1.439** 2.095** 
dens 1700)    (.050) (.056) (.039) (.047) (.052) (.078) 
Log(pop inc)      2.011**    
      (.065)    
Log (cntry       .408**   
pop inc)       (.078)   
Pop inc All All All All All All All High Low 
Capital incl Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed eff No No No No No No No No No 
Only W Eur No No No No No No No No No 
No. obs. 109,048 109,048 109,048 94,071 30,481 92,221 94,071 53,774 38,447 
Models 2-9 are logistic regressions with urbanization in 1900 as the dependent variable. Model 1 is a logistic 
regression with urbanization in 1700 as the dependent variable. Standard errors presented in parentheses below 
coefficients. The “Odds ratio” row presents the odds ratios for the inheritance dummy in all models. Standard 
errors are corrected for arbitrary autocorrelation of up to order 4, using the procedure in Conley (1999). 
Significance of coefficients: ** = significant at .99 level, * = significant at .95 level. 
Table 1: Main results 
 M10 M11 M12 M13 M14 M15 M16 M17 M18 M19 
Uneq .645** .430** .645** .633** .453** .738** .558** .741** .716** .680** 
inheritance (.087) (.099) (.087) (.156) (.173) (.149) (.173) (.103) (.112) (.113) 
Odds ratios 1.906** 1.538** 1.907** 1.883** 1.573** 2.092** 1.748** 2.099** 2.047 1.974 
Urbaniz.  1700 1.805** 1.797** 1.850** 4.758** 1.819** 4.720** 1.828** 5.051** 1.881** 1.862** 
 (.139) (.160) (.141) (.204) (.209) (.207) (.215) (.134) (.144) (.147) 
Log(pop 1.577** 1.778** 1.563**  2.022**  2.010**  1.489** 1.467** 
dens 1700) (.052) (.040) (.049)  (.090)  (.092)  (.060) (.062) 
Log (pop)  1.961**         
increase)  (.066)         
Log (cntry   .404**      .365** .391** 
pop increase)   (.076)      (.090) (.087) 
Capital 7.213** 5.587** 7.194**       - 
 (720) (.649) (.717)        
Pop. inc. All All All All All All All All All All 
Capital Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed eff. No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Only W Eur No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
No. obs. 94,071 92,221 94,071 30,345 29,541 30,322 29,518 63,324 53,367 53,254 
Models 10-19 are logistic regressions with urbanization in 1900 as the dependent variable. The “Odds ratio” row 
presents the odds ratios for the inheritance dummy in all models. Standard errors are corrected for arbitrary 
autocorrelation of up to order 4, using the procedure in Conley (1999). Significance of coefficients: ** = 
significant at .99 level, * = significant at .95 level. 
Table 2: Extensions 
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The theoretical discussion suggests that population increase should determine the 
degree of pressure for leaving the land under the two regimes. Models 8 and 9 show that this 
was indeed the case. The sample was split into areas with population growth above and below 
the mean of the population increase variable. Model 8 shows that indeed, in high-growth areas 
the unequal inheritance dummy predicts more urbanization, with an odds ratio of around 2. 
Model 9 shows that in low-growth areas, the coefficient on unequal inheritance is much smaller 
and not statistically significant. 
A capital city can serve as a magnet, especially for jobs in government and 
administration, for citizens across a country, regardless of whether the capital itself is located 
in an equal or unequal inheritance area. Separating out the capital city is important because of 
possible spillovers from areas with a different inheritance rule into the urbanization or non-
urbanization of the capital city, and because we want to be sure the results are not given entirely 
by capitals. Models 10, 11, and 12 repeat the specifications of models 4,6, and 7, while 
controlling for an area being a capital city as of 1900. The coefficients remain similar, showing 
that the effect on urbanization was not due to capital-city effects. 
Looking at variation within countries, through fixed-effects models, allows keeping 
constant any factors that are specific to the country as a whole and therefore these models are 
more credible in terms of our causal claims. Such factors, which could act as potential omitted 
variables and are captured by the fixed effect, might include cultural aspects, political-system 
aspects, and geographical location, among others. In the sample there exists within-country 
variation in the inheritance rules in present-day Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Switzerland, 
Austria, Slovakia, and Poland. Models 13 to 16 present some of the previous models together 
with country fixed effects. The coefficients in these models, while less precisely estimated due 
to the lower sample size, remain similar in magnitude to those in the pooled sample and are 
still statistically significant. This shows that, even while accounting for all factors that might 
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be constant at the level of the territory of the present-day country, the connection between 
inheritance systems and urbanization is not broken. 
Finally, models 17, 18, and 19 present some of the previous specifications on only a 
Western-European sample, to make sure that the effects are not generated by the distinction 
between Eastern and Western Europe. This subsample contains countries including and to the 
west of Finland, Germany, Austria, and Italy of today. The coefficients are similar in magnitude 
to those for the full sample. A similar challenge is given by the broad distinction between 
Germanic, versus Slavic and Latin areas of the continent. While such distinctions are somewhat 
arbitrary, model 35 in table 9 of the appendix presents a check that controlling for this 
distinction along with other more speculative controls does not modify the conclusions 
substantially. 
The following sections discuss various robustness checks on these conclusions, the 
results of which are included in the appendix. An alternative approach to constructing an 
indicator of urbanization status is taking into account the population of each urban or rural cell. 
This could provide an even finer-grained measure of the degree of urbanization, at the cost of 
some additional complexity in interpretation, and of the fact that urban population figures are 
obviously estimates. Tables 4 and 5 from Appendix present versions of the statistical models 
from the body of the paper in which the dependent variable is the log of either the urban 
population per cell, or the rural population per cell. (The values are zero if the cell is rural, and 
urban respectively). The results here are very similar in nature to those in the main models, 
which should not be a surprise given that population density and urbanization status are closely 
correlated. 
An alternative approach to modelling the dependence between observations is to use 
standard errors clustered at the level of the modern-day country, reflecting the fact that error 
terms within these units are likely correlated. Tables 6 and 7 in the appendix present the main 
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models with clustered standard errors, and the results do not change meaningfully in terms of 
significance levels. 
The incomplete stem family is characterized by a distribution of inheritance that is 
possibly more equalitarian than the stem family type, due to increased legal pressures towards 
equalitarianism. (Todd, however, argues this did not make a large difference in practice.) Table 
8 presents the main models on data in which the incomplete stem family type is coded either 
as .5 or 0 (equal inheritance) as a robustness check. While the magnitude of coefficients is 
somewhat reduced, the main conclusions are not affected. 
Another source of possible measurement error is given by the presence of institutions 
which allowed the nobility to induce some degree of inequality in inheritance, in situations in 
which this conflicted with an equalitarian tradition. Todd focuses on traditions applying to the 
majority of the population, and therefore codes such regions, including Castile, France, and 
ancient Poland, based on this latter criterion. The extent of this phenomenon remains 
unexplored in Todd’s work, however there is little reason to believe that its existence is biasing 
the results presented above in a major way. First, this still leaves these territories with an 
unequal inheritance tradition for the great majority of the population, to which the theoretical 
mechanisms being proposed still apply. Second, there is little reason to believe that such 
measurement error is correlated with the outcome, and therefore it is likely that in as much as 
it is relevant it simply induces attenuation bias in the magnitude of the coefficients. 
An emerging literature on urban development has identified a wide variety of factors 
which have favored urban growth in Europe and elsewhere. (The literature is reviewed in 
Dincecco and Onorato 2016, 2017, and some of the main references are discussed below). The 
role of inheritance being proposed here should be seen as a complement to these factors, in a 
process which was undoubtedly multi-causal. A first set of arguments connects city growth 
with natural features such as access to rivers, natural trade routes, or coastline (Rokkan 1975, 
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Tilly 1992, Motamed et al 2014). There is little reason to believe such natural factors are 
connected to inheritance practices, which would generate omitted variable bias, and moreover 
the use of urbanization status at the beginning of the period in most models is designed to 
absorb such permanent features. Another set of arguments (Abramson and Boix 2014, 
Anderson et al 2015, Motamed et al 2014) connects city growth with agricultural productivity. 
It should be clear that increases in agricultural output are necessary to sustain urban population, 
but for the logic of the inheritance argument, this is at most a channel through which the effect 
of inheritance traditions is transmitted, as the great increases in agricultural productivity from 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are post-treatment to the inheritance variable. A further 
set of arguments connects the existence of constraints on the executive to urban growth (De 
Long and Shleifer 2003, van Zanden et al. 2012). This factor is accounted for in model 35 in 
the appendix, by using a measure of executive constraints from Marshall et al (2002).  
Introducing this control does not substantively change the conclusions, and at any rate it is 
doubtful this element played an exogenous influence towards inheritance systems, which 
generally developed before and through processes which are not immediately related to 
representative government institutions. Another set of arguments connects the potential for 
interaction with the rest of the world, especially after the discovery of the New World, with 
social and economic development (Nunn and Qian 2011). This will be controlled for in model 
35 through a measure of access to coastline, again without changing the results in a 
substantively relevant manner. A recent contribution (Dincecco and Onorato 2016) connects 
urban growth with warfare, arguing that war pushed population into cities through a number 
of channels. This argument however, is only made for the medieval and early modern period 
(900-1800), as the mechanisms being proposed by Dincecco and Onorato are unlikely to apply 
to warfare and urban growth in the 19th century. On the same note of avoiding potential 
relevant covariates, the use of fixed effects in models 14-16 serves to absorb many factors 
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which were constant at the level of the country, and strengthens the causal argument. A further 
challenge to the causal argument may arise from possible endogeneity from urbanization to 
inheritance rules. We have to allow for the possibility that inheritance rules, even if ancient in 
origin, developed in response to the opportunities to move to the cities. There is no evidence 
in the historical literature that this was the case, but the possibility remains intriguing in 
principle. A strong argument against it, however, is that the very limited extent of urbanization 
in centuries before the eighteenth would have not provided sufficient stimulus for this process 
to unfold, as cities were simply not large enough anywhere to absorb a significant proportion 
of the population. A further counterargument is that in a regime of low or close to zero 
population growth, which prevailed in earlier centuries, the pressures for leaving the land 
would have been more reduced anyway.  
 
Results for political outcomes 
The effects of urbanization and the consequent rise of urban working and middle classes on 
political reform have been argued many times before. Moore (1966), Collier (1999), 
Rueschemeyer, Huber, and Stephens (1992), and Acemoglu and Robinson (2000a) are some 
major references for a line of argumentation that connects social conflict between rising 
working and/or middle classes and established elites as the driver for political liberalization in 
Europe. Given the influential intellectual tradition connecting urbanization with 
democratization, and the connection between inheritance and urbanization that is being 
proposed here, it is useful to illustrate the connection between such political outcomes and the 
inheritance variables, as a further support for their importance to the comparative development 
of the continent. Figures 2 and 3 present the distribution of two indicators of democratization, 
taken from (Marshall et al. 2002), under the two inheritance regimes, together with formal tests 
of equality between the groups. Figure 2 presents the distribution of the constraints on the 
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executive measure presented by Marshall et al. among European countries in their sample as 
of 1900. (All countries, save the UK are coded as having no constraints in 1800.) The three 
groups in the boxplot are that of countries which had equal inheritance systems over their entire 
1900 territory, that of countries that had a mix of equal and unequal inheritance, and that of 
countries that had only unequal inheritance. The differences between the EI group and the other 
two are significant at conventional levels (p=.005 and .002 respectively), and substantively 
large (3.23 and 3.32 respectively). This proves that encountering unequal inheritance inside a 
jurisdiction is indeed associated with a much higher degree of control over the executive 
developing throughout the 19th century. Similarly, figure 3 presents the distribution of Polity 
composite democracy scores among the European countries of 1900. Similarly to the previous 
measure, all countries save the UK and France were coded as fully autocratic in 1800. By 1900, 
countries that had at least some unequal inheritance regions had developed a significant 
distance (7.52 and 7.62 points on a 20-point scale) from the EI countries in terms of their Polity 
democracy score, confirming the theoretical expectations. (The dots in each figure are 
represent Greece, which is coded as a 10 on the democracy scale in the Polity data in 1900.) 
While these findings are not the main focus of the argument in this article, they do help justify 
the relevance of inheritance traditions to social transformation going beyond just urbanization, 
and serve as further justification of the focus on their study. 
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Figure 2: Constraints on the executive in 1900 across inheritance traditions 
 
 
Figure 3: Democracy in 1900 across inheritance traditions 
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Results on biographical data 
Data on differentiations between the occupational choices and sources of income of first- born 
sons (who inherited most or all of the land in primogeniture systems) and their younger 
brothers, under the two inheritance traditions, would strengthen our claims. The basic 
hypothesis regarding the career and occupational paths of first and younger sons that emerges 
from the theory is that under an unequal inheritance system, younger sons are more likely to 
be pushed into making a living from occupations other than landholding and farming, which 
would lead to the development of such nontraditional occupations and therefore to 
urbanization. Extensive biographical data on families in various European countries during the 
time period under analysis is generally not available. Genealogical data on elite families is one 
exception, so we make use of biographical data on elite families in two countries with opposite 
inheritance rules: the United Kingdom (UK), a classic example of unequal inheritance, and 
Romania (the principalities of Moldova and Walachia before 1859) a country with a tradition 
of equal distribution of the wealth among sons. Uncovering differences in the career paths of 
dynasties in the two countries would serve as a further robustness and plausibility check on the 
overall argument, as they are a necessary implication of the theoretical framework. 
To study differences between first-born and younger brothers in the two countries, we 
collected comparable samples on the career and occupational paths of pairs of at least two 
brothers in the period 1700 to roughly 1850. The sources of data for the two cases were two 
similar volumes containing biographies of aristocratic families. For the UK, the source is 
Burke’s Peerage (1869), which presents the genealogies of members of the peerage in the UK, 
as of the year of publication, along with short biographical notes on each individual mentioned. 
In the case of Romania, the data comes from a volume by Lecca (1899), which follows a nearly 
identical format, and presents biographical data on boier (noble) families in the two 
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principalities of Moldova and Walachia. As both sources attempt an exhaustive listing of 
aristocratic families, the two samples should be representative of the population of interest. 
In both cases we selected from the genealogy pairs of at least two brothers for which it 
can be established that they were all born after 1700, which survived into adulthood, and for 
which there is information available beyond just the name. Only pairs where the birth order 
can be clearly established have been selected. In both cases, pairs of brothers in which any of 
them are born after 1850 are omitted, to allow for their occupations/career choices to be 
recorded as adults. 
Following these criteria, we were able to record 93 pairs of brothers from Romania, the 
maximum number possible by parsing the book by Lecca from the first to the last family. Given 
that information on genealogy and birth order in the British case was recorded more precisely, 
we were able to collect a corresponding 93 pairs of brothers by taking a sample. Collecting a 
similar number of cases is useful for maintain comparability between results from the two 
countries. In both cases, for each pair of brothers, the father’s name and “occupation” (to be 
defined in the following) are recorded, as well as the occupations of all brothers, in order of 
birth. Occupations are coded in the following categories: 
Nothing/property owner. In both the UK and Romania, the default occupation for 
aristocrats in this period was to be a rentier, deriving income from the ownership of land and 
other property. In case nothing is mentioned about any professional activities among the ones 
to be listed below, the individual is coded as having a landed occupation/career path. 
 Government/politics. In both countries, aristocrats often played a role in politics and 
government. The extent to which this indicates a non-landed career or not is debatable, 
therefore two sets of results will be presented. On the one hand, individuals in both countries 
sometimes developed extensive political or administrative careers and derived substantial 
incomes from that. On the other hand, a role in politics was often a natural complement to a 
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landed, rentier, lifestyle and interests, and it is difficult to distinguish between the two 
situations given the available data. The models in table 3 therefore present two sets of results, 
in which a government occupation is coded as either non-landed, or landed, to reflect this 
uncertainty. In the UK, an individual is coded as “government” if he played a role in the 
executive or administration at any point in his career or was a member of the (elected) House 
of Commons. All men holding a peerage became by default members of the House of Lords, 
so this will not be recorded as a career choice. In the case of Romania, recording governmental 
or political work is somewhat more challenging, due to the different political structure. On the 
one hand, especially in the 19th century, there are individuals in the sample who clearly have 
a role in the administration, executive, or are members of parliament, and such individuals can 
reliably be coded as “government”. On the other hand, as it was the case in many continental 
European countries, nobility was often associated with carrying a title indicative of an 
administrative role at the royal court. In some instances such titles did really correspond to 
work in government, in others they were merely honorary titles carried by individuals who 
continued to live as rentiers. To get around the difficulty of deciding on such occupations, 
Table 3 presents both models where they are coded as governmental occupations and models 
where they are not. 
Military. In both cases, nobles and their sons often had careers in the military, and this 
is recorded separately. 
Law. This will only be applicable in the UK case, as there are no individuals practicing 
law in the Romanian sample. If the individual is listed as an esquire or judge, or had another 
position in the judicial system, he is recorded under “law”. 
Private/other. This includes all other jobs that were neither in government, nor the 
military, nor in law. 
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In the case of the UK, emigrating to another part of the empire is also recorded 
separately. 
We first code as “traditional occupation” individuals who were only landowners in the 
UK, and individuals who were either only landowners or only landowners plus having a titled 
position but no clear political function in Romania. In addition, in a second set of models, we 
also code a government role as landed. All other career pathways are coded as non-traditional. 
The final sample contains 93 sets of brothers from each country, for a total of 303 individuals 
in the UK and 253 in Romania. When coding government occupations as non-landed, 
approximately the same percentage of sons are counted as having non-landed occupations in 
both countries (61.4% vs 60.8% in Romania), largely due to the fact that all sons 
disproportionately participated in political roles in Romania. If coding these roles as landed, 
then the proportion changes substantially, with 51.8% non-landed in the UK and 26.88% in 
Romania. The truth is likely somewhere in the middle, indicating that overall sons were on 
average more likely to take non-landed occupations in the UK than in Romania, as would be 
expected. 
Table 3 presents the results of linear regressions of a dummy indicating landed 
occupation on either a dummy for younger (second and later) son, or individual dummies for 
sons 2 and later, with the first-born as the baseline. The results show that in the UK, younger 
sons were as a whole some 25-31 percentage points less likely to have had a purely landed 
occupation, and this difference is highly statistically significant. Model UK2 shows that second 
sons were some 20 percentage points less likely to have a landed occupation than first-born 
ones, third sons, some 30 percentage points less likely, and so on. (Output is suppressed after 
the 5th son, and there are few such cases in the sample). Similarly, model UK 4 shows even 
larger differences between first and later sons. 
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 UK1 UK2 UK3 UK4  Ro1 Ro2 Ro3 Ro4 Ro5 Ro6 
Younger son -.249**  -.316**   .012  .000  -.063  
 (.059)  (.060)   (.054)  (.064)  (.058)  
2nd son  -.208**  -.285**   .010  .021  -.043 
  (.070)  (.071)   (.062)  (.072)  (.056) 
3rd son  -.306**  -.369**   .032  .004  -.063 
  (.078)  (.079)   (.075)  (.087)  (.079) 
4th son  -.287**  -.339**   -.017  -.057  -.105 
  (.096)  (.098)   (.117)  (.137)  (.123) 
5th son  -.274*  -.274*   -.017  -.191  -.371 
  (.136)  (.138)   (.193)  (.226)  (.204) . 
No. obs. 303 303 303 303  253 253 253 253 253 253 
Linear regressions (linear probability models) of landed occupation on a dummy variable for younger son, or 
dummy variables for birth order number with first-born as baseline category. Output suppressed for sixth and later 
sons. Models UK3, UK4, Ro5 and Ro6 define government employment as landed, and the other models define it 
as non-landed. In models Ro1 and Ro2, landed occupation is defined to exclude traditional titled positions. In 
models Ro3 and Ro4, landed occupation is defined to include traditional titled positions. Significance levels: **: 
significant at the .99 level, *: significant at the .05 level. 
Table 3: Birth order and occupations in the UK and Romania 
 
In the case of Romania, several kinds of models are presented, depending on how the 
traditional titled positions, and also government positions in general, are coded. Ro1 and Ro2 
exclude individuals who held traditional titles from the landed group, while Ro3 and Ro4 
include individuals who are recorded as only holding these occupations as landed-occupation 
individuals, while in both cases counting government jobs as non-landed. Models Ro5 and Ro6 
count government jobs as landed (and do not record traditional titles as government 
employment). Regardless of the coding choice and the model estimated, there is virtually no 
difference between first and later sons in terms of occupational specialization, as would be 
expected from the theoretical argument. 
 
Conclusions 
This article has presented evidence that unequal inheritance traditions have favored 
urban development and therefore political change, in modern Europe. The evidence in favor of 
this the effect is quite robust. Fixed effects models that look at “within” variation inside the 
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regions corresponding to a present-day country show that regions with UI traditions were 
significantly more likely to urbanize. Similarly, the effect is present when looking at just a 
Western European sample, and when leaving out capital cities. The analysis of elite families 
in the UK and Romania shows that one hypothesized mechanism behind this effect, based on 
differential economic specializations of first and younger sons under the two traditions is 
indeed encountered in the data. This body of evidence shows that traditional inheritance rules 
have indeed played a significant role in the comparative political development of Europe, and 
encourages further attention to such anthropological variables in explaining political 
phenomena. 
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 1 
Appendix (Not intended for publication) 
 
 
 
 
 M20 M21 M22 M23 M24 M25 M26 M27 
Uneq .028** .149** .125** .157** .282** .038** .116** .08** 
inheritance (.006) (.013) (.010) (.014) (.023) (.009) (.009) (.024) 
Log( cell   .809** .809 1.05** .644** .702** .712** 
urban pop 1700)   (.030) (.030) (.028) (.038) (.030) (.040) 
Log (cntry 
pop 
inc) 
   .058** 
(.009) 
    
Capital       8.200** 
(.380) 
 
Pop inc All All All All High Low All All 
Fixed eff No No No No No No No Yes 
Only W Eur No No No No No No No No 
No. obs. 109,048 109,048 109,048 109,048 47,427 61,621 109,048 30,345 
Models 21-27 are linear regressions with log cell urban population in 1900 as the dependent variable. 
Model 20 is a linear regression with log cell urban population in 1700 as the dependent variable. 
Standard errors presented in parentheses below coefficients. Standard errors are corrected for arbitrary 
autocorrelation of up to order 4, using the procedure in Conley (1999). Significance of coefficients: ** 
= significant at .99 level, * = significant at .95 level. 
 
Table 4: Main models with cell urban population as dependent variable 
 
 
 
 M29 M30 M31 M32 M33 M34 
Uneq -.344** -.708** -.145** -.581** -.556** -.699** 
inheritance (.051) (.021) (.017) (.032) (.020) (.021) 
Rural p. 1700  .884** .884** .973** .985** .883** 
  (.030) (.004) (.006) (.010) (.005) 
Log (cntry pop 
inc) 
  1.018** 
(.014) 
   
Capital      -5.79** 
(.429) 
Pop inc All All All High Low All 
Fixed eff No No No No No No 
Only W Eur No No No No No No 
No. obs. 105,694 105,694 105,694 44,073 61,621 105,694 
Models 30-34 are linear regressions with log cell rural population in 1900 as the dependent variable. 
Model 29 is a linear regression with log cell rural population in 1700 as the dependent variable. Standard 
errors presented in parentheses below coefficients. Standard errors are corrected for arbitrary 
autocorrelation of up to order 4, using the procedure in Conley (1999). Significance of coefficients: ** 
= significant at .99 level, * = significant at .95 level. 
 
Table 5: Main models with cell rural population as dependent variable 
 2 
 
 M1c M2c M3c M4c M5c M6c M7c M8c M9c 
Uneq .700 1.181** 1.202** .650** .658** .428 .651** .699* .252 
inheritance (.665) (.440) (.364) (.189) (.182) (.367) (.198) (.362) (.351) 
Odds ratios 2.031 3.260** 3.329** 1.915** 1.879** 1.534 1.917** 2.011* 1.287 
Urbaniz.  1700   5.442** 1.881** 1.743** 1.806** 1.913** 2.166** 1.365* 
   (.42) (.520) (.524) (.467) (.547) (.417) (.587) 
Log(pop    1.590** 1.820** 1.805** 1.576** 1.439** 2.095** 
dens 1700)    (.202) (.201) (.083) (.191) (.219) (.182) 
Log (pop 
inc) 
     
2.011** 
(.193) 
   
Log (cntry 
pop inc) 
      .408 
(.301) 
  
Pop inc All All All All All All All High Low 
Capital incl Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed eff No No No No No No No No No 
Only W Eur No No No No No No No No No 
No. obs. 109,048 109,048 109,048 94,071 30,481 92,221 94,071 53,774 38,447 
Models 1c - 9c repeat models 1-9 from Table 1, while presenting standard errors clustered at the level 
of the present-day country in parentheses. Significance of coefficients: ** = significant at .99 level, * = 
significant at .95 level. 
 
Table 6: Models from table 1 with clustered standard errors 
 
 
 M10c M11c M12c M13c M14c M15c M16c M17c M18c M19c 
Uneq .645** .430 .645** .633* .453* .738* .558** .741 . .716** .680** 
inheritance (.188) (.373) (.197) (.300) (.190) (.294) (.175) (.454) (.213) (.217) 
Odds ratios 1.906** 1.538 1.907** 1.883* 1.573* 2.092* 1.748** 2.099 2.047 1.974 
Urbaniz.  1700 1.805** 1.797** 1.850** 4.758** 1.819 4.720** 1.828** 5.051** 1.881** 1.862** 
 (.546) (.488) (.579) (.931) (.939) (.956) (.993) (.493) (.602) (.642) 
Log(pop 1.577** 1.778** 1.563** 
 
2.022** 
 
2.010** 
 
1.489** 1.467** 
dens 1700) (.210) (.086) (.199)  (.314)  (.317)  (.256) (.268) 
Log (pop 
increase) 
 
1.961** 
(.207) 
        
Log (cntry 
pop increase) 
  .404 
(.312) 
     .365 
(.371) 
.391** 
(.375) 
Capital 7.213** 
(.876) 
5.587** 
(.729) 
7.194** 
(.858) 
      - 
Pop. inc. All All All All All All All All All All 
Capital Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed eff. No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Only W Eur No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
 3 
No. obs. 94,071 92,221 94,071 30,345 29,541 30,322 29,518 63,324 53,367 53,254 
 
Models 10c -19c repeat models 10-19 from Table 2, while presenting standard errors clustered at the 
level of the present-day country in parentheses. Significance of coefficients: ** = significant at .99 
level, * = significant at .95 level, . = significant at the .10 level.  
 
Table 7: Models from table 2 with clustered standard errors 
 
 
 
 M1i50 M2i50 M3i50 M7i50 M1i00 M2i00 M3i00 M7i00 
Uneq .616** 1.023** 1.049** 548.** .487** .813** .831** .379** 
inheritance (.140) (.084) (.081) (..88) (.140) (.089) (.087) (.089) 
Urbaniz.  1700   5.436** 1.897**   5.432** 1.879** 
   (.134) (.141)   (.113) .141 
Log(pop    1.580**    1.584** 
dens 1700)    (.047)    (.047) 
Log (cntry 
pop inc) 
   .402 
(.079) 
   .402 
(.081) 
Pop inc All All All All All All All All 
Capital incl Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed eff No No No No No No No No 
Only W Eur No No No No No No No No 
No. obs. 109,048 109,048 109,048 94,071 109,048 109,048 109,048 94,071 
Models M1i50-M7i50 repeat models M1-M7 from table 1, while coding the inheritance tradition of the 
incomplete stem family as .5 instead of 1. Models M1i00-M7i00 repeat models M1-M7 from table 1, 
while coding the inheritance tradition of the incomplete stem family as 0 instead of 1. Standard errors 
are corrected for arbitrary autocorrelation of up to order 4, using the procedure in Conley (1999). 
Significance of coefficients: ** = significant at .99 level, * = significant at .95 level. 
 
Table 8: Main models with alternative coding of inheritance for the incomplete stem family 
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 M35 
Uneq .592** 
inheritance (.137) 
Urbaniz.  1700 1.880** 
 (.149) 
Log(pop 1.628** 
dens 1700) (.048) 
Log(coast .258** 
to area) (.058) 
Constraints -.189** 
on exec (.030) 
Germanic .329** 
 (.129)( 
Pop inc All 
Capital incl Yes 
Fixed eff No 
Only W Eur No 
No. obs. 93,314 
 
Model M35 is a logistic regression with urbanization in 1900 as the dependent variable. Standard errors 
presented in parentheses below coefficients. Standard errors are corrected for arbitrary autocorrelation 
of up to order 4, using the procedure in Conley (1999). Ireland, the UK, Netherlands, Germany, 
Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Germany are coded as Germanic (1), and Belgium and Switzerland 
are coded as 0.5. Significance of coefficients: ** = significant at .99 level, * = significant at .95 level.  
 
Table 9: Additional results 
 
 
